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GEORGE CARLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SCHOLAR

Christine A. Corcos•

There are 400,000 words in the English language, and
there are seven of 'em ya can't say on television. What a
ratio that is. Three hundred and ninety-nine thousand
nine hundred and ninety three to seven. They must really
be bad.1

I. INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court handed down its 1978 ruling in
Federal Communications Commission

v.

Pacifica Foundation, :l it

upheld the authority of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) to regulate indecency on the public airwaves. Unfortu
nately, the Court gave the agency relatively little guidance con
cerning the definition of "indecency," a point that George Carlin
made

repeatedly

during

a

1973

monologue

that,

ironically

enough, was the subject of the ruling. But a clear message that
the Court did deliver to the FCC and to licensees was that Carlin
had successfully identified seven words that the FCC could regu
late on broadcast television and radio.:l

•
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George Carlin. Seuen Words You Can M•tt<'r Say on Tt•l1•f'isio11. in Clas.� Clo1rn

(Atlantic Recording Corp. J9i2) (CD).

2.
:l.

4:l8 U.S. 726 (1978).
For a verbatim transcript ofC"nrlin'" monologu1>,

SN'

id.

nt
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We have now lived with Pacifica and Carlin's insights for
three decades.4 In this Article, the Author would like to make
some suggestions concerning the importance of the points Carlin
made in his monologue entitled Seven Filthy Words.5 Further,
given the recent Second Circuit ruling in Fox Television Stations
v. FCC,6 the Author urges the FCC to revisit its current indecency
policy, which seems to have become increasingly unworkable.
II. BASIS FOR AND HISTORY OF FCC REGULATION
UNTIL THE PACIFICA RULING
Before one can understand the importance of Carlin's obser
vations and of the impact he had on subsequent media law, one
should spend some time considering the history of FCC enforce
ment actions. To start, it is worth noting the distinction between
"obscenity" and "indecency." Two commentators, Keith Brown and
Adam Candeub, have examined the historical meanings of "ob
scenity" and "indecency." They suggested that the Court was in
correct in ascribing separate meanings to the words "obscene" and
"indecent" (as it did in Pacifica) for the following historical rea
son:7

[Doctor] Milagros Rivera-Sanchez suggests that the 1927
Radio Act8 language was largely lifted from the Commerce
Department pamphlet of 1914, Regulation 210 discussed
above. The First Radio Conference produced a draft radio
bill dated April 18, 1922; section 3(E)(e) of the document
states that an operator's license shall be suspended if he

4. George Carlin died from heart failure on June 22, 2008 in Santa Monica. Ed
Payne, Award-Winning Comedian George Carlin Dies, http://us.cnn.com/2008/SHOWBIZ/
06/23/carlin.obit/index.html (June 23, 2008). He was 71. Id. Of the case which
made him
famous to generations of lawyers and law students, he said the following: '"So my
name is
a footnote in American legal history, which I am perversely proud of."'
Id. He was wrong.
His name was, and is, much more than a "footnote," as the Author hopes
this Article dem
onstrates.
5. Carlin, infra n. 47. This monologue is sometimes entitled Seven Dirty Words;
how
ever, this Article will consistently use the title Seven Filthy Words.
6. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
7. Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction,
2005 BYU L. Rev. 1463, 1478 (2005).
8. The 1927 Radio Act stood for the proposition that radio waves are public and thus

private ownership of them was forbidden. Id. at 1474-1475. One could use these airwaves
only with the government's permission. Id. at 1475.
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"has transmitted superfluous signals, or signals containing
profane or obscene words or language." This language ex
actly matches the Commerce Department pamphlet. When
Senator Clarence Dill introduced H.R. 9971, however, he
"inverted the order of the terms profane and obscene and
added the word 'indecent."' There is no stated reason why
Senator Dill did this and thus very little one can conclude
about the significance of the revision. This version with
slight changes was adopted into the 1927 Act. This interest
ing historical footnote suggests that the Pacifica opinion was
probably incorrect in claiming that indecency and obscenity
referred to different concepts. Certainly, there is no evidence
that the statute's drafters thought the two words had dis
tinct meanings. Rather, the evidence, slim as it is, suggests
that the congressmen envisioned prohibitions on one unitary
category of inappropriate speech.9

Brown and Candeub further discussed the legislative history of
subsequent Acts, noting that Congress adopted the "obscenity,
indecency, and profanity language" into the 1934 Communica
tions Act with no change and then into the 1948 Criminal Code. 10
Additionally, Brown and C andeub noted that until the 1960s
the FCC brought very few indecency enforcement actions against
broadcasters . 1 1 Indeed, the period itself, which was one of mani
fest conformity, resulted in few complaints to the agency, and
those

complaints

that

did

materialize

ended

in

less-than

categorical censures.12 Broadcasters themselves evinced no par
ticular interest in challenging a status quo, 13 established by both

9. Id. at 1478-1479 (citations omitted).
10. Id. at 1479. "[The 19 34 Communications Act] established the Federal Communica·
tions Commission (FCC) and transferred authority over spectrum decisions from the [Fed·
era! Radio Commission] (FRC) to the FCC." Id. The 1934 Communications Act appears
generally within Title 47 of the United States Code, and the 1948 Criminal Code refers to
the 1 948 version of Title 18 of the United States Code.
1 1 . See id. at 1482-1483 (noting that the shift in broadcasting enforcement occurred in
the 1 960s).
1 2 . Id.
13. Id. This period was also the heyday of the anti-Communist search within govern
ment and business with which many media insiders participated wholeheartedly. See
generally Edward Alwood, Dark Days in the Newsroom: McCarthyism Aimed at the Press
(Temple U. Press 2007) (reviewing congressional investigations of communism and the
press, previously undisclosed FBI files and interviews, and actions of publishers in protect·
ing their economic interest to analyze the protections accorded under the First Amend
ment); but see generally Thomas P. Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCar-

[Vol. 37
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the FCC and the National Association of Broadcasters, that
seemed to reflect social sensibilities.14
A shift in mores beginning in the early 1960s brought a con
sequent increase in FCC enforcement actions.15 As broadcasters
became more adventurous (perhaps to appease the growing com
ponent of listening and viewing audiences, which showed more
interest in what one might call "frisky" topics), the FCC re
sponded to the complaints (about the language used) of those who
disapproved of the shift toward such content.16 But while the lanthyism, and American Culture (Columbia U. Press 2003) (arguing that America became
more tolerant and open through the media, notwithstanding McCarthyism). Note, how
ever, that in other spheres, the media
seph Burstyn, Inc.

v.

was

challenging this "conformist" doctrine. See Jo

Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952) (reversing the state court's decision

that sustained a state agency's refusal to issue a license for exhibition of a film on grounds
that it was "sacrilegious"); see also Times Film Corp.

u.

Chi., 365 U.S. 43, 44-45 (1961)

(dismissing the complaint of a film company that asserted the city's film-review board's
requirement that all films be presented for examination was unconstitutional as a prior
restraint under the First and Fourteenth Amendments). Although many in the movie
industry believed that the industry's Production Code seal of approval was necessary for
success, United Artists bucked the trend, and in 1953, it released Otto Preminger's The
Moon Is Blue (which used the forbidden word "virgin") without the seal of approval. New
Pictures, Time Mag. (July 6, 1953) (available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,822872,00.html); The Moon Is Blue (United Artists 1953) (motion picture). It
was clear not every person felt the same way about the movie's content:
In spite of the published controversy over the decency of the filmed version of [The
Moon Is Blue], which has been passed by the New York State censors but judged im
proper by the industry's own code, this glib little tract on maidenly virtue opened
here yesterday. And, unless our observers missed it, the pit didn't yawn nor the
heavens fall.
Bosley Crowther, ''The Moon Is Blue," Preminger's Film Version of Play, Opens at the Sut
ton and Victoria, N.Y. Times (July 9, 1953) (available at http://movies.nytimes.com/movie/
review?res=9902E6DD173DE23BBC4153DFB1668388649EDE) (describing also the film's
use of the taboo words "seduce" and "pregnant"). Three days later, Crowther gave an up
date of the situation, noting that in spite of the industry's continued refusal to give the
film a seal of approval, or perhaps because of it, the film was attracting large audiences.
Bosley Crowther, Outside the Code: "The Moon Is Blue" Hits Snag On Screen, N.Y. Times
(July 12, 1953). For more on the battle over the film, see Leonard J. Leff & Jerold L. Sim
mons, The Dame in the Kimono, 196-209 (2d ed., U. Press Ky. 2001) (explaining the flaws
of rating by tracing the Production Code and motion picture censorship up to the year
2000). Leff and Simmons' book also reproduces the Motion Picture Production Code which
'
went into effect in 1924. Id. at 285-300.
14.

The media, including broadcasters and the motion picture industry, made certain

for years to report faithfully both to governmental and quasi-governmental bodies about
its activities in fighting what might be considered objectionable portrayals on screen and
airwaves. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1482-1483. For a copy of the code the industry
used, see Motion Picture Assn. of Am., A Code to Govern the Making of Motion Pictures; the
Reasons Supporting It and the Resolution for Uniform Interpretation (Wash. 1955).
15.

Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1483.

16.

In 1964, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the FCC's denial of a license renewal to radio
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guage used was suggestive, it was not, at least by Carlin's stan
dards, indecent.17 That is, the language made reference to behav
ior that raised images in the listeners' minds, which was in part
what had gotten earlier satirists and commentators into trouble.1s
By themselves, the words used might not necessarily be consid
ered "bad words," but they were "coarse, vulgar, suggestive[,] or
su sceptible of indecent double meaning."19 As Carlin pointed out
in his famous monologue (and as was recognized in its variations),
the words have no meaning by themselves; these meanings are
learned.2° Further, as commentator William A. Huston and others
have noted, "in order for any word to have meaning, it must have
an

a

priori meaning agreed upon by both parties. Hearing it again

simply invokes this prior knowledge, or the memory of its mean
ing."21

station WDKD on the basis that the licensee had permitted indecent or offensive material
to be broadcasted and/or that he had misrepresented facts to the FCC with regard to the
broadcast of that material. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1 964). The pro
gram involved what was generally known as the ''Uncle Charlie" or the "Charlie Walker"
program, a radio show with radio personality Charlie Walker that was deemed indecent.
Id. at 535-536.
17. For a list of examples of radio personality Charlie Walker's "obscene" chatter, see
dustbury.com, Stern Realities, http://www.dustbury.com/archives/002324.html (Feb. 29,
2004). One example references a dog urinating on cars, which is certainly not indecent
under Carlin's standard. Id.
1 8 . Another example of Charlie Walker's "double meaning" language is the following
witty remark: "Now I done got sick and tired of all you fools giving me the devil about what
I said about ol' so and so. Listen to me. Any of y'all out there that don't like what I said,
y'all can all come up here to this radio station, and just kiss my ass . .. it's tied up right
here at the back of the station!" Id.; see also Robinson, 334 F.2d at 535 (referring to
Walker's language as "suggestive" and having a "double meaning'').
1 9 . See Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Paul Gates, Abortion on the Air: Broadcasters and
Indecent Political Advertising, 46 Fed. Commun. L.J. 267, 283 n. 87 ( 1 993-1994) (discuss
ing how the FCC never defined "indecency," but instead used these other words to describe
its definition).
20. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 752.
2 1 . William A. Huston, Under Color of Law: Obscenity vs. the First Amendment, 1 0
NEXUS 75, 7 7 (2005) (citation omitted) (emphasis i n original). This phrase "a priori mean
ing'' signifies that the person attached the particular meaning previously. Id. For example,
an obscene word to a person who speaks English is not given the same meaning as that
obscene word to a person who cannot speak English or who has never heard the word
previously. Id. Indeed, Huston discusses briefly the notion that obscenity might be a
thought crime "if one accepts the aforementioned propositions [that words have an agreed
upon meaning], and the utterance causes injury, how can one determine which utterance
caused the injury? Since the injury derives from the stimulation of a memory, is obscenity
in fact a thought crime?" Id. at 77-78.
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By the early 1970s, while Richard Nixon served as president,
the FCC was hot on the trail of "bad words."22 In 1970, the FCC
fined Eastern Education Radio one hundred dollars over musician
Jerry Garcia's use of the words "shit" and "fuck" although he used
the words to emphasize a point and not in an "excretory" man
ner.:?:1 The FCC, noting that the case was one of first impression,24
maintained that both Title 18, Section 1464 of the United States
Code and the licensee's public-interest requirement mandated
that the licensee (and more specifically, the interviewers) should
have cautioned Garcia to not use objectionable language.:.i5 The
licensee had failed to do so.26 The FCC also noted that regardless
of which requirement it applied to measure the behavior of the
licensee, "the criteria for [its] action thus remains the same, in
our view-namely. that the material be patently offensive and
utterly without redeeming value."27 However, because the mate
rial was broadcast over the public airwaves, the agency took the
position that the standard could be less stringent for indecent and
offensive material than it was for potentially obscene material
available, for example. at the local bookstore.
Two years later. the FCC pounced on Sonderling Broadcast
ing for airing material that fit within the new popular "topless
radio.. format. fining Sonderling's Oak Park, Illinois station two
thousand dollars.is "Topless radio" consisted generally of discus-

22.

Brown & Cnndeub. s11pra n. 7. at 1484.

21.

Id. The tTC's decision can be found at In Re WUHY·FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (19i0).

:\tr. lrarcia was interviewed in hia hotel room. WUHY-FM. 24 F.C.C.2d at 408. The inter·
,,ewers taped the converMtion and aired it the next night. Id. Mr. Garcia used phrases

rlurinit the inteniew like "[shit! man" and "[pjolitical change is so [fucking] slow." Id.
24. n-c.:Hr-FM. 24 F.C . C. 2d at 412.

Id.

2.;. Id. at 414. The Commission suggested the following:
[T]he station employees could have cautioned Mr. Garcia either at the outset or after
the first few expres!lions to avoid using these "gratuitous" expressions; they did not
clo so. That the material was presented without obtaining the station manager's ap
proval-contrary to station policy-does not absolve the licensee of responsibility.
26.

Id. (de!!<'ribing the station's failure to caution Garcia to avoid further use of "gra

tuitous" eitpressions as "gross negligence on the part of the licensee with respect to its

supt•n·isory duties').
27.

Id. The Commission noted that "in sensitive areas like this, the Commission can

nppropriatl'ly ac t only in clear-cut, flagrant cases: doubtful or close cases are clearlv
. to he
rt'>•olvecl in thi> licensee's favor." Id. (citations omitted).
:l�.

Brown & Candeub. supra n. i. at 1484. The Sonderling opinion is available at Jn re

So11cfrrli11Jl Uroad. Corp

. .

41 F.C.C.2d iii (197:1).
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sions of rather explicit sexual topics between masters of ceremo
nies and callers.29 In seeking reconsideration of the FCC's deci
sion to fine Sonderling,30 two advocacy groups argued that the
ruling caused a "chilling effect" that deprived listeners of "expo
sure to speech and ideas about important issues, thereby abridg
ing

[complainants']

First

Amendment

rights to receive 'free

speech by radio."'31 However, the Commission determined that
the ruling did not have the feared "chilling effect" even though
Sonderling had eliminated its sex-talk show. 32 It drew the distinc
tion between offensive programming (which the FCC cannot pro
hibit from the airwaves) and "obscene and indecent" programming
(against which the FCC may take action under Title 18, Section
1464 of the United States Code).33 Sonderling's sex show fell into
the latter category.34 Further, the agency noted that the fact that
children might have been in the audience was not the basis for its
decision;35 rather, it had acted because of the "pervasive and in
trusive nature" of the show.36

29. John C. Carlin, The Rise and Fall of Topless Radio, 26 J. Commun. 31, 31 (Winter
1976).
3 0. Sonderling maintained that it was not liable but nevertheless submitted to the
fine. Sanderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d at 779.
31. Id. at 780. The two advocacy groups were the Illinois Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting and the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union. Id. at 777.
The Petitioners offered the following examples of the "chilling effect":

(1) Sonderling's cancellation of its sex-talk program; (2) Storer Broadcasting Com
pany's reported change in the format of the "Bill Balance Show," the most widely
heard of the sex-talk programs, whereby "intimate topics" will be forbidden; and
(3) the [National Association of Broadcasters] resolution of March 27 condemning
and deploring "tasteless and vulgar program content. "
Id. at 780.

3 2. Id. at 783.
3 3. Id. at 784.
3 4. Id. at 782. The Commission notes in its decision that
we must be sensitive to allegations that our actions have forced licensees to abandon
controversial programs which are not unlawful .... Our Notice to Sanderling was
prompted not by the fact that WGLD-FM had a sex-talk show; many other stations
also had such programs and have not been assessed. We acted against Sanderling
solely because the station had broadcast obscene and indecent language . .. .
Id. a t 784.

35. Id.
36. Id. The agency continued to note that since the program in question was broad
casted during the afternoon hours, its content could not possibly have been expected to
reach only adults. Id. That the offensive content could reach children served to aggravate
the offense. Id.

[Vol. 37
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The agency was clearly establishing a policy that offensive
language and offensive content were impermissible during the
afternoon hours even if children

were not

in the audience.37 The

FCC said the following about child listeners:
We went on to point out, however, that children were "in the
audience during these afternoon hours," and we cited evi
dence which indicated that the program was "not intended
solely for adults." From this, we concluded that "the pres
ence of children in the broadcast audience makes this an a

fortiori matter." The obvious intent of this reference to chil
dren was to convey the conclusion that this material was
unlawful, and that it was even more clearly unlawful when
presented to an audience which included children.38

The FCC disclaimed any ability to determine whether the statute
under which it made its determinations was constitutional.39 But
it did say that
[o]ur application of the statute in the Sonderling case was
precisely in line with the then[-]relevant Supreme Court decisions on obscenity, as we read them ... , and consistent
with the limited Commission precedent .... [T]he Supreme
Court has decided a series of cases which we believe rein
force our analysis.40

Sonderling's refusal to challenge the FCC order in federal
court ultimately proved to be devastating in terms of other broad
casters' abilities to challenge similar or more broadly aimed or-

37.

Id.

38.

Id. (emphasis in original).

39.

Id. at 781. The Commission noted that Congress created the statute at issue, and

that the Commission was not vested with the power "to set aside enactments of Congress."
Id. The Commission did give its opinion that the statute was indeed constitutional, and it
supported this conclusion with the fact that Congress had previously adopted the sub
stance of Section 1464 numerous times in the past. Id. The Commission pointed out that
the language
was adopted as part of the Radio Act of 1927 and again as part of the Communica
tions Act of 1934, and it was reenacted in the 1948 revision of the Criminal Code. In
1960, Congress effectively reenacted the substance of 1464 when it incorporated the
statute by reference in Section 503 of the Communications Act, the forfeiture stat
ute.
Id. at n. 13.
40.

Id. (citations omitted).
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ders. 41 The FCC had moved quite quickly from declaring indecent
the "useless" expletives that Jerry Garcia had uttered42 to declar
ing indecent the content that Sanderling's licensee broadcasted.43
The stage was set for the next clash between the agency and a
broadcaster. It was to be a battle to determine whether the FCC
would consider indecent language protected if it was accompanied
by serious analysis or whether even that context would fail to pro
tect licensees from sanctions. The test came with a 1973 broad
cast in which George Carlin's monologue figured prominently.44

III. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PACIFICA RULING
George Carlin was a satirist, and one of his methods was us
ing occasionally shocking language to get a reaction from his au
dience. Before and after his Seven Filthy Words monologue, he
had shown an interest in words-in society's use, overuse, or mis
use of them and in society's reaction to them. Consider his analy
sis of the ever-popular invitation to board an airplane:
It starts at the gate: "We'd like to begin the boarding proc

ess." Extra word. "Process." Not necessary. Boarding is suf
ficient. "We'd like to begin the boarding." Simple. Tells the
story. People add extra words when they want things to
sound more important than they really are. "Boarding proc
ess" sounds important. It isn't. It's just a group of people get
ting on an airplane.
To begin their boarding process, the airline announces
they will preboard certain passengers. And I wonder, How
can that be? How can people board before they board? This I
gotta see. But before anything interesting can happen I'm
told to get on the plane. "Sir, you can get on the plane now."
And I think for a moment. "On the plane? No, my friends,
not me. I'm not getting on the plane; I'm getting in the
plane! Let Evel Knievel get on the plane, I'll be sitting inside
in one of those little chairs. It seems less windy in there."

4 1 . E.g. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
42. See supra nn. 22-27 and accompanying text (discussing Jerry Garcia's case).
43. See generally Sanderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 777 (discussing the "topless
radio" broadcasts).
44. See infra nn. 49-B5 and accompanying text (discussing the start of the controversy
and ensuing j udicial battle regarding George Carlin's Seven Filthy Words).
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Then they mention that it's a nonstop flight. Well, I
must say I don't care for that sort of thing. Call me old
fashioned, but I insist that my flight stop. Preferably at an
airport. Somehow those sudden cornfield stops interfere with
the flow of my day. And just about at this point, they tell me
the flight has been delayed because of a change of equip
ment. And deep down I'm thinking, ''broken plane!"

Speaking of potential mishaps, here's a phrase that ap
parently the airlines simply made up: near miss. They say
that if two planes almost collide it's a near miss. Bullshit,
my friend. It's a near hit! A collision is a near miss. 45

Carlin introduced his Seven Filthy Words monologue and a
variant, Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television, in the
early 1970s and has since revised it several times.46 He performed
it before audiences in theaters and it is available on CD.47 To
some extent, one could plausibly accept his statement that his
purpose in creating the Seven Filthy Words monologue was to de
termine, as he said, "the curse words and the swear words, the
cuss words and the words that you can't say, that you're not sup
posed to say all the time ...."48 The "all the time" he speaks of
includes using these words on the television or radio airwaves.
On October 30, 1973, Paul Gorman's 2:00 p.m. program,
"Lunchpail," which broadcasted in New York City on WBAI-FM,
discussed and analyzed society's attitude toward the use of lan45.

George Carlin, Airline Announcements: Part One, in Napalm & Silly Putty 12-13

(1st ed., Hyperion 2001) (emphasis in original).
46.

Commentators speculate that Carlin created the monologue in the wake of the

Sanderling decision to test the FCC's indecency policy. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730 (ex

plaining that Carlin's monologue was part of a program that discussed contemporary soci
ety's attitude toward language).
47.

George Carlin, Occupation: Foole (Atlantic Recording Corp. 2000) (originally re

corded in 1973).
48.

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755 (transcribing the Seven Filthy Words monologue).

This transcript does not match the recording on the CD available from the Pacifica Foun
dation, which reproduces it with bleeps. FCC, F1V 024: George Carlin, Pacifica, and the
FCC (Pacifica Radio Archives 2006) (CD) (copy on file with Author). What the CD seems to

reproduce more closely matches the routine known as Seven Words You Can Never Say on
Television from Carlin's 1972 CD, Class Clown. Carlin, supra n. 1. The Author spoke at

length with Brian De Shozar of Pacifica on October 15, 2007. Telephone Interview with
Brian De Shozar, Dir., Pacifica Archives (Oct. 15, 2007). He told her that the CD actually
includes material from a live recording made at the Santa Monica Civic Auditorium in
1977. Id. Since no live recording seems to exist of the original 1973 broadcast, Pacifica
Foundation reconstructed a broadcast using tapes available from its archives. Id.
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guage.49 As "an incisive satirical view of the subj ect under discus
sion,"50 Gorman played a broadcast, which closely resembled
Carlin's monologue from the album Occupation: Foole.51 Immedi
ately prior to the broadcast of the monologue, listeners were ad
vised that it included language that some might regard as offen
sive and that those who might be offended should change stations
and turn back in fifteen minutes. 52
Approximately one month after the broadcast, the FCC re
ceived a complaint from John H. Douglas, a man in New York
City who heard Gorman's October 30 program while driving in his
car.53 Douglas, a minister and a board member of Morality in Me
dia,54 complained that his "young son"55 was with him and had
49. In re Citizen's Comp[. against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI (FM), 56 F.C.C.2d 94,
95 ( 1 975).
50. Id.
5 1 . The content of this monologue seems to have been essentially equivalent to the
Seven Filthy Words monologue although it may have crucially differed in some major re
spects. See infra nn. 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing differences between the
monologues). The WBAI host played a portion of the Occupation: Foote album. Pacifica
Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 1 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). But in many
instances, radio stations did not keep records of what they broadcast, so Pacifica recon
structed the broadcast. Supra n. 48. Comedians' routines change often, so although the
1 973 Occupation: Foote version of the monologue was broadcast that day, it differs from
other versions of the same sketch-the words may change, but the nature of it stays the
same.
52. Br. of Respt. at 3, FCC v. Pacifica Found. Station, 438 U.S. 726 (1973).
53. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95.
54. Huston, supra n. 2 1 , at 81 n. 45. Morality in Media is a lobbying organization
founded in 1962 to protect children and the community by combating child pornography as
well as other indecencies seen in various forms of media. Morality in Media, Inc., Home
Page, http://www. moralityinmedia.org (accessed Apr. 27, 2008).
55. According to an article by Robert Corn-Revere, Douglas' son was fifteen. Robert
Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery: Exon vs. the Internet, CATO Policy Analysis No. 232,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-232.html (June 28, 1995). Mr. Corn-Revere was lead
counsel for CBS in the recent case of Fox Television Stations v. FCC in the Second Circuit.
See Fox TV Station v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 445 (2d Cir. 2007). According to William A.
Huston, the boy's age was twelve. Huston, supra n. 21, at 8 1 n. 45 (citing Ltr. from John H .
Douglas to FCC Enforcement Bureau, Letter of Complaint (Nov. 28, 1973)). University of
Texas Law Professor Lucas A. Powe suggested that Mr. Douglas' description of his son as
"young" rather than as a teenager (if, indeed, the son was a teenager) was part of Morality
in Media's agenda to draw the agency's attention to what it considered the growing prob
lem of indecency on the airwaves, which it thought the FCC was ignoring. Lucas A. Powe,
Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment 1 86 (U. Cal. Press 1987). If Mr.
Douglas' son were indeed fifteen, he certainly must have already been exposed to four
letter words. Id. Powe hypothesized further that it is unlikely that Mr. Douglas, who cer
tainly would not qualify as a typical Pacifica listener, actually heard the show of which he
complained. Id. Powe noted finally that the FCC did not take immediate action on the
complaint, waiting nearly a full year before commencing action. Id. at 186. This might
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piss, "" motherheard words sueh as "cock sueker,""fuck , ""cunt , "".
6
fucker," and "shit" used on public airwaves.5 Mr. Douglas stated
that "[t]his was supposed to be part of a comedy monologue" and
that "[a]ny child could have been turning the dial, and tuned in to
that garbage."57
In response to Mr. Douglas' complaint, the licensee stated the
following:

George Carlin is a significant social satirist of American
manners and language in the tradition of Mark Twain and
Mort Sahl. Like Twain, Carlin finds his material in our most
ordinary habits and language-particularly those "secret"
manners and words which, when held before us for the first
time, show us new images of ourselves.... Carlin is not
mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as
harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those
words.
As with other great satirists-from Jonathan Swift to
Mort Sahl-George Carlin often grabs our attention by
speaking the unspeakable, by shocking in order to illumi
nate. Because he is a true artist in his field, we are of the
opinion that the inclusion of the material broadcast in a pro
gram devoted to an analysis of the use of language in con
temporary society was natural and contributed to a further
understanding on the subject.58
After receiving the licensee's response, the FCC noted that
the Communications Act, which "prohibited the [FCC] from en
gaging in censorship or interfering 'with the right of free speech
by means of radio communication,"' was originally under Section

indicate, according to Powe, that the agency was waiting for a resolution in the pending

Sonderling case. Id. at 186-187 (discussing the case and "topless radio"). Sanderling did
not appeal, but some Illinois citizens, concerned about the "chilling effect" of the sanction,
filed suit on behalf of the station. See id. at 185 (citing Ill. Citizens Comm. for Broad.

v.

FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (1974)) (discussing a citizens' group intervention to appeal the Sonder
ling decision).
56. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 96. In an interview on Pacifica's From the Vault CD, Mr. Gorman seems to
suggest that he did not originally intend to play the Carlin excerpt. FCC, supra n. 48.
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326 and subsequently transferred to Section 1464 of Title 18 of
the United States Code.59
The following is part of Carlin's Seven Filthy Words mono
logue in which he critiqued the FCC's policy by using some of the
words he thought the agency would ban. 60 He explained, admit
tedly using less elegant language than would an attorney, why he
believed such a policy is flawed:

Aruba-du, ruba-tu, ruba-tu. I was thinking about the curse
words and the swear words, the cuss words and the words
that you can't say, that you're not supposed to say all the
time, [']cause words or people into words want to hear your
words. Some guys like to record your words and sell them
back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on the telephone,
write down what words you say.... Okay, I was thinking
one night about the words you couldn't say on the public, ah,
airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't say, ever....
And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I have
to figure out which ones you couldn't and ever and it came
down to seven but the list is open to amendment.... The
original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker,
motherfucker, and tits.61 Those are the ones that will curve
your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe,
even bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter)
um, and a bourbon. (laughter) And now the first thing that
we noticed was that word fuck was really repeated in there
because the word motherfucker is a compound word and it's
another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You want to be a
purist it doesn't really-it can't be on the list of basic words.
Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that
is really dirty. The word-the half sucker that's merely sug
gestive (laughter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty
59. Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C. C.2d at 96.
60. The following monologue is reproduced exactly as it was printed in the Pacifica
opinion.
61. Currently, the F C C restricts obscene material from radio and television broadcasts
completely. F C C, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity, Frequently Asked Questions, "What Is
the Safe Harbor?," http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html (updated Apr. 27, 2 0 07). However,
from 10 p.m. through 6 a.m. radio and television stations may broadcast indecent material.
Id. The F C C defines indecent speech as "material that, in context, depicts or describes
sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive as measured by con
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium." Lili Levi, First Report: The
FCC's Regulation of Indecency 2-3 (First Amend. Ctr. Aug. 6, 2 0 07) (available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/PDF/FirstReport.Indecency.Levi.pdf).
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word, 50% dirty-dirty half the time, depending on what you
mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember when you first heard it,
like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the cock crowed
three times, heh (laughter) the cock-three times.It's in the
Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you
heard about a cock-fight, remember-What? Huh? naw. It
ain't that, are you stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's
chickens, you know, (laughter) Then you have the four letter
words from the old [Anglo]-Saxon fame. Uh, shit and fuck.
The word shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in that the
middle class has never really accepted it and approved it.
They use it like, crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a
rude, dirty, old kind of gushy word. (laughter) They don't
like that, but they say it, like, they say it like, a lady now in
a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the time she says it
as an expletive, you know, it's out of her mouth before she
knows.... I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album.
Isn't that groovy? ... That's true . . . [']cause (laughter)
that's based on people liking it man.... Ha! So! Now the
word shit is okay for the man. At work you can say it like
crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get that shit out of here, will ya?
I don't want to see that shit anymore. I can't cut that shit,
buddy. I've had that shit up to here.I think you're full of shit
myself. ... The big one, the word fuck that's the one that
hangs them up the most. [']Cause in a lot of cases that's the
very act that hangs them up the most. So, it's natural that
the word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word,
fuck. nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to
say. One syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You
know, it's easy. Starts with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a
kuh. Right? (laughter) A little something for everyone. Fuck
(laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud word, too. Who are
you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE MOUNTAIN.
(laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting word too, [']cause
it's got a double kind of a life-personality-dual, you know,
whatever the right phrase is. It leads a double life, the word
fuck. First of all, it means, sometimes, most of the time,
fuck. What does it mean? It means to make love. Right?
We're going to make love, yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're
going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're
really going to fuck, yeah, we're going to make love. Right?
And it also means the beginning of life, it's the act that be
gins life, so there's the word hanging around with words like
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love, and life, and yet on the other hand, it's also a word that
we really use to hurt each other with, man. It's a heavy. It's
one that you have toward the end of the argument. (laugh
ter) Right? (laughter) You finally can't make out. Oh, fuck
you man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck.
(laughter) Fuck you and everybody that looks like you.
(laughter) man. It would be nice to change the movies that
we already have and substitute the word fuck for the word
kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches
would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop
me before I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck
the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch
Bill, you'll fuck that engine again. (laughter) ... The addi
tions to the list. I found three more words that had to be put
on the list of words you could never say on television, and
they were fart, turd and twat, those three. (laughter) Fart,
we talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a cutie word,
no problem.Turd, you can't say but who wants to, you know?
(laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm
not worried about that one. Now the word twat is an inter
esting word. Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is
an interesting word because it's the only one I know of, the
only slang word applying to the, a part of the sexual anat
omy that doesn't have another meaning to it. Like, ah,
snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even
in a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going to snatch
that pussy and put him in a box and bring him on the air
plane. (murmur, laughter) Everybody loves it. The twat
stands alone, man, as it should. And two-way words. Ah, ass
is okay providing you're riding into town on a religious feast
day. (laughter) You can't say, up your ass. (laughter) You
can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can
say its weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I,
uh, want to, ah, thank you for listening to my words, man,
fellow, uh space travelers. Thank you man for tonight and
thank you also. (clapping whistling)62

In this monologue, Carlin pointed out that some words are on the
list because they suggest certain behaviors as well as indecency.
Others appear on the list, even if they are by themselves not inde-

62. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755. The transcript provided by the FCC is appended to
the Pacifica opinion.
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cent, because when compounded with other words they take on
indecent meanings (the best example of this type of compound
word is "motherfucker") . Still others appear even though they are
generally accepted in other contexts-for example, in the work
place or used accidentally-which suggests that the indecency
rules are not general standards, but instead are standards that a
minority applies to the majority. Carlin also pointed out that
some words cannot be spoken on the radio even though the words
appear in great literature (the Bible, for example, uses the word
"cock") . 63 He also noted that some words may or may not be ac
ceptable depending upon how the word is being used and its
meaning (the "ass" reference) . But the objection to sexually sug
gestive language is odd, he said, since violence is so pervasive,
and yet so many people seem not to object to it. Sports metaphors
are particularly violent and quite prevalent on the radio. Yet
those seem to offend people to a far lesser degree than the "dirty
words." His satirical suggestion that we replace the word "kill"
with the word "fuck" only makes this point more clear.64 Lawyers
have made such literacy arguments with varying degrees of suc
cess, but none, the Author would suggest, as vividly as Carlin.65
63.

E.g. Mark 14:30 (King James) (using the word in the context of a chicken as fol

lows: "And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto thee, That this day, even in this night,
before the cock crow twice, though shalt deny me thrice").
64. See Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 7 1 1 (2007) (discussing the
treatment of the word "fuck" in legal jurisprudence).
65. See John Crigler, In re KBOO Foundation, Response to Notice of Apparent Liability

for Forfeiture, http://www.gsblaw.com!resource/pub_result.asp?ID=l 7261 4792001 (July 6,
2001) (attaching Sarah Jones' song Your Revolution to the brief filed on behalf of the radio
station to show that the context of the song could change the meaning). The FCC told
Portland, Oregon radio station KBOO that it was in violation of FCC rules against inde
cency for playing Jones' song. Id. Lawyers for the station argued that the piece was a cri
tique of society, that the FCC could not reasonably divorce its lyrics from the music, and
that the FCC should consider the airing of the song in the context of the program, an ar
gument which had failed in Pacifica. Id. In addition, attorney John Crigler noted that the
FCC failed to consider the context in which Jones used the allegedly impermissible words.

Id. Crigler further argued that
[w] hen indecency, "which is largely a function of context," [Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742)
is stripped of any thoughtful consideration of context, enforcement of the Commis
sion's indecency standard becomes prohibited censorship . . . . The Commission im
poses fines not because a broadcaster unreasonably concluded that material satisfies
indecency standards, but solely because the material contains "sexual references"
that are "similar" to references in prior Commission rulings. Sealed off from any vi
tal considerations of context[-]the views of the artist, the audience, the station, the
programmer and local educators[-] Commission rulings thus mechanically perpetu
ate themselves. "Offensiveness" is measured not by reference to "contemporary"
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In the FCC ruling on the complaint, Commissioner Glen Rob
inson's concurring statement, which Commissioner Benjamin
Hooks joined, illustrates the kind of thinking that Carlin criti
cized. 66 Robinson wrote in his concurrence that
[o)n reading George Carlin's monologue, my first instinct
was to affirm his opinion that these were indeed words "you
couldn't say on the public . . . airwaves." Reflection pushed
me to the opposite extreme: proper respect for the principles
of free speech and of noninterference by government in mat
ters of public decency and decorum commands us to reject
Carlin's opinion and accept that of Pacifica. On still further
reflection, I am led to conclude, along with my colleagues,
that even a rigorous respect for the principles of free speech
and government non-intervention permits some accommoda
tion to the demands of decency. 67

Commissioner Robinson continued,
I initially had some difficulty with the idea that "literary, ar
tistic, political[,] or scientific value" could constitute a de
fense to allegedly indecent language at one time of the day
but not at another. I have concurred in this rule, however,
because I understand it simply to carry forward an aspect of
the "nuisance" idea .

.

. . 68

In the same breath, Commissioner Robinson asserted that
indecency "is not a property of language, but arises when dirty
words are uttered at inappropriate times or in inappropriate cir
cum stances."69 If he did not think that indecency was a "property

standards but by rulings that indicate only what has offended FCC officials in the
past. "Standards for the broadcast medium" are. in fact. not standards at all. for the
Comm ission rejects all proffered evidence concerning such standards and bases its
rulings solely on its views of offensiveness and its view of merit. To punish

a

station

for the broadcast of officially disfavored subject matter is the essence of governmen·
tal censorship.
Id. (emphasis in original). Jones also filed suit against the FCC: although a court dis

missed the suit, the agency reversed itself and found that the broadcast of the song

was

not indecent. In re K.BOO Foundation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, http://hraunfoss
.fcc.gov/edocs_ public/a ttachmatch/DA-03·469Al .pdf (Feb. 20. 2003).
66. Citizen 's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 103.
67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 108 n. 9.

69.

Id.
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of language," he could have referred to the words in question sim
ply as "words" and not as "dirty words." He could have discussed
uttering them in "certain circumstances," rather than in "inap
propriate circumstances." The p ejorative word "inappropriate"
indicates the degree to which the Commissioner was disinclined
to find in Pacifica's favor:

Demonstrating that children are not unsupervised in
the audience because of the late hour changes the context,
and correlatively it changes the balance to be struck among
the competing values, and whether particular language
ought to be regarded as illegal or not.
On the issue of artistic value as a defense, one further
point should be mentioned. Pacifica's comparison of Carlin
with Mark Twain strikes me personally as being a bit
jejuene. But no one should suppose that an author must be a
giant of letters in order to receive protection for works which
have "serious literary [or] artistic ... value." The Constitu
tion protects lesser literary lights as well as those with the
artistic candlepower of Mark Twain. If I were called on to do
so, I would find that Carlin's monologue, if it were broadcast
at an appropriate hour and accompanied by suitable warn
ing, was distinguished by sufficient literary value to avoid
being "indecent" within the meaning of the statute.70
The balancing test proposed here still rests on the notion that
Carlin's speech is a "nuisance" that must be channeled to a more
appropriate time of day because its literary value is less than that
of the "giant of letters" to whom the Commissioner here compares
its author. 7 1 The suggestion is still that whatever "literacy value"
Carlin's monologue contains shines forth only from behind the

70.

Id. (alteration in original) .

71.

Id. That the FCC Commissioners were not as sympathetic to Carlin's viewpoint as

the majority of the District of Columbia Circuit is obvious from the following excerpt of the
Commission's majority opinion:
Carlin's use of the "dirty words" was designed in part to demonstrate that they have
acquired many popular meanings, apart from their literal meanings. For example,
the phrase "I'm shit-faced" has nothing to do with an excretory activity or organ. It
means, "I am drunk." The irony of the Order is that non-"obnoxious" synonyms for
the dirty words (such as "feces" for "shit") are not banned even though such syno
nyms are only understood in their literal, "obnoxious sense."

Pacifica Found., 556 F.2d at 23 n. 1 7 (Brazelon, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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barricade o f an "appropriate hour" and a "suitable warning." All
in all, even though Robinson suggested that he was making no
value judgments, value judgments were clearly at play.
Pacifica successfully appealed the unfavorable ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir
cuit.7 2 The FCC subsequently appealed the case to the Supreme
Court.
In eventually upholding the FCC's initial ruling and revers
ing the District of Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court applied a
similar balancing test73 and recognized that Carlin's speech as
broadcasted on Gorman's "Lunchpail" program was "vulgar, of
fensive, and shocking."74 The Court seemed to recognize that
whatever social value came from Pacifica's broadcast that after
noon was "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."75 This balance suggests that speech from something of
a proportionately higher "social interest" might be protected at
2 : 00 p.m. even if it contained the same type of language as

Carlin's monologue.76
The Court then clarified the narrowness of its holding by
stating that " [t]his case does not involve a two-way radio conver
sation between a cab driver and a dispatcher [ ] or a telecast of an
Elizabethan comedy."77 Notice the differences in the types of
speech here. The two-way conversation might not normally be
accessible to children. Both its purpose and its method of commu
nication would tend to ensure that children are not in the audi
ence. The Elizabethan comedy, like the Pacifica broadcast that
afternoon, might easily be accessible to children.78 However, the

72. Id. at 10.
73. See id. at 750 (listing the following variables to be considered in evaluating the
context of the broadcast: time of day, program content, and type of broadcast media).
74. Id. at 747.
75. Id. at 746.
76. See id. at 750 (distinguishing Carlin's monologue from an Elizabethan comedy).
77. Id.
78. Youth-oriented Shakespeare festivals can be found throughout the United States
and England. E.g. Folger Shakespeare Lib. , Children's Shakespeare Festival, http://www
.folger.edu/template.cfm?cid=607 (accessed June 13, 2008); U. Pitt., Department of Theatre
Arts, Shakespeare-in-the-Schools, About Us, http://www.play.pitt.e du/sits/about.html (up
dated Oct. 24, 2007); Shakespeare Schs. Festival, Shakespeare Schools Festival, Festival
History, http://www.ssf.uk.com/aboutus/festivalhistory (accessed June 13, 2008).
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Court automatically seems to assume that the dramatic work has
more value than Carlin's satire.79
Both the FCC ruling and the Supreme Court opinion sidestep
(although they certainly do not miss) Carlin's point in the mono
logue, which was that there was no list specifying words that the
government forbade broadcasters, or anyone else, to say. The
modern speaker is not on notice. In other words, a broadcaster
proceeded at its own risk when using controversial language be
cause there was no government list specifying what language
could and could not result in a sanction. It was only after the
broadcaster used the controversial words (and a listener subse
quently filed a complaint) that the FCC provided a ruling that the
language was unacceptable. 8° Carlin's list has both a satirical and
a practical purpose . He meant to poke fun at the FCC, but he also
wanted to assist others by pointing out what words are dangerous
and that the danger lies in perceptions that change over time. The
word that is considered filthy and unacceptable today could be

considered acceptable tomorrow.81

The Supreme Court's majority opinion does not confront the
First Amendment defense seriously, but instead frames the issue
as one in which it is required to "decide whether the Federal Com
munications Commission has any power to regulate a radio
broadcast that is indecent but not obscene."82 The FCC defended
its rationale by linking

the concept of "indecent" ... [to] the exposure of children to
language that describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the
79. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (distinguishing Carlin's monologue from a telecast
Elizabethan comedy without any support for that distinction).
80. See supra nn. 1 5-44 and accompanying text (describing cases prior to Pacifica
where the FCC sanctioned radio stations for "indecent" double entendres and "topless
radio" programs).
8 1 . A word's unacceptability lies as much in the context in which one speaks as in the
word itself. Thus, the bawdy words that are now acceptable when spoken by an actor in an
Elizabethan comedy are acceptable precisely because a modern audience does not under·
stand them. For more about the Elizabethan comedy, see Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (dis·
cussing the Elizabethan comedy compared with Carlin's monologue) . If the audience does
not understand the language, as in the Elizabethan comedy example, why should the
words be more acceptable than when the audience does understand them, as in the Carlin
monologue example?
82. Id. at 729. Note that this is the opening sentence of Justice Stevens' majority opin
ion. Id.
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broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs,
at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that chil
dren may be in the audience.83

Rather than limit the construction of Section 1464 to obscene lan
guage, as Pacifica urged, the Court accepted the FCC's interpre
tation.84 Thus, the Court accepted the distinction between "inde
cency" and "obscenity," noting that, as used in the statute, the
terms are disjunctive.85 Consequently, it did not accept Pacifica's
notion that "prurient appeal" need be a component of indecent
language. 86 While "prurient appeal" is a component of the obscen
ity test, in the Court's view it is not part of the FCC's indecency
regime.87 Finally, the Court rejected Pacifica's constitutional ar
gument that the FCC's order was overbroad88 and that Carlin's
monologue was not obscene. 8 9
To address Pacifica's argument that the monologue was not
obscene, the question of the actual content of Carlin's monologue
might have been important if the routine Seven Words You Can

Never Say on Television had been broadcast. Instead, WBAI chose
to broadcast the routine Seven Filthy Words from the LP Occupa

tion: Foole, released in 1973,90 instead of the routine Seven Words
You Can Never Say on Television, released in 1972 .91 Carlin's
message in these two routines is essentially the same. The intro
ductions to the routines, however, differ.
83. Id. at 731-732 (quoting Citizen's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 98) (cita
tion omitted).
84. Id. at 74 1 . There was no basis for disagreeing with the FCC's conclusion that the
broadcast involved "indecent" language. Id.
85. Id. at 740; see supra nn. 7-10 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
history of the terms "obscenity" and "indecency").
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742. The Court rejected the argument that the order was
overbroad because it "was issued in a specific factual context" and that the Court's review
is limited to "this particular broadcast." Id.
89. See id. at 742, 744-75 1 (identifying Pacifica's argument and describing the reasons
for rejecting it). First, the Court noted that offensive content was not entitled to absolute
constitutional protection and that its context must be considered. Id. at 747-748. The
Court went on to justify the FCC's ability to regulate the "undisputed[ly] . . . 'vulgar,' 'of·
fensive,' and 'shocking"' monologue on the grounds that broadcasting is "uniquely perva
sive . . . in the lives of all Americans" and is "uniquely accessible to children . . . " Id. at
.

748-74 9.
90. Citizen 's Compl. against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d at 95.
9 1 . Carlin, supra n. 1.
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The following i s the Author's transcript of the introduction to
the

Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television

routine. It dif
fers considerably from the FCC-provided transcript, 92 and it in
cludes commentary that might have lifted Carlin's broadcast from
the "unredeeming" into, perhaps, the redeemable.
I wanna tell you something about words that I think is im

portant. I love, as I say, they're my work, they're my play,
they're my passion. Words are all we have really. We have
thoughts, but thoughts are fluid . . . and then we assign a
word to a thought and we're stuck with that word, for that
thought, so be careful with words. I like to think, yeah the
same words, you know, that hurt can heal, it's a, it's a mat
ter of how you pick them. There are some people that aren't
into all the words, there are some people who would have
you not use certain words . . . yeah, there are four hundred
thousand words in the English language and there are seven
of 'em ya can't say on television. What a ratio that is. Three
hundred and ninety-nine thousand nine hundred and ninety
three to seven. They must really be bad. They'd have to be
OUTRAGEOUS to be separated from a group that large. All
of you over here-you seven-bad words. That's what they
told us they were, remember. That's a BAD WORD . No bad
words. Bad thoughts, bad intentions, and words . You know
the seven, don't you, that you can't say on television-shit,
piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those
are the heayy seven. Those are the ones that'll infect your
soul, curve your spine and keep the country from winning
the war. Shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker,
and tits. Wow. And tits doesn't even belong on the list, you
know. Man. That's such a friendly sounding word. Sounds
like a nickname.93
These differences, however, may be moot. Even if WBAI had
broadcast the

Seven Words You Can Never Say on Television

rou

tine, one cannot be certain that the FCC would not have still
92. See supra nn. 60-62 and accompanying text (quoting the FCC -provided transcript
of Seven Filthy Words).
93. Carlin, supra n. 1. Pacifica Foundation provides this CD as a representation of the
original broadcast years later. It bleeps the words apparently because after the Supreme
Court decided the case, licensees were prohibited from broadcasting them. Note, however,
that one may purchase the George Carlin CDs and thus can obtain the recorded uncen
sored monologues.
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found the list of words offensive simply because the FCC probably
still would have received at least one complaint and it would very
likely have acted upon that complaint. Since the words in the list
are the same, Carlin's explanation-the words represent pro
tected thoughts, they are few in number, and they are not "outra
geous"-would not have been likely to head off the FCC's action.
Nevertheless, by limiting its review to whether the agency
could "proscribe this particular broadcast," the Court sidestepped
the question of constitutionality.94 Evaluating the approach in a
fact-specific way is "appropriate for courts as well as the Commis
sion when regulation of indecency is at stake, for indecency is
largely a function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in
the abstract."95 The problem with this approach is that, with re
gard to the content of Carlin's monologue, context matters a great
deal. And context was part of Carlin's point. He linked form to
content, and both to context.
The Court said its approach was not inconsistent with the
approach it took in Red Lion Broadcast Company

v.

FCC,96 where

it held the FCC could impose the fairness doctrine on broadcast
ers. 97 The fairness doctrine required that broadcasters discussing
public issues give each side of the issue fair treatment.98 The Red
Lion Court made its ruling despite criticis m that forcing broad

casters to present fair coverage of an issue would cause some
broadcasters to stop airing discussions of important social is
sues. 99 The Pacifica Court noted that, like Red Lion, its decision
may l ead some broadcasters to censor themselves. At most,
however the Commission's definition of indecency will deter
'
only the broadcasting of patently offensive references . . . .

94. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742.
95. Id.
96. 395 U.S. 367 ( 1 969).
97. Id. at 369.
98. Id. Broadcasters challenged this rule, arguing that the First Amendment protected

their right to "use their allotted frequencies continuously to broadcast whatever they
choose, and to exclude whomever they choose from ever using that frequency." Id. at 386.
The Court rejected that argument, holding that the scarcity of broadcast frequencies re
quired the government to protect access to those frequencies. Id. at 40H01 . The FCC
aba ndoned the fairness doctrine in 1987, however, after determining that it was no longer
in the public interest. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir.
1 989) (upholding the FCC's decision to discard the fairness doctrine).

99.

Pacifica,

438 U.S. at 743.
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While some of these references may be protected, they surely
lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern . . . . The
danger dismissed so summarily in Red Lion . . . was that
broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regula
tions by refusing to present programs dealing with impor
tant social and political controversies. Invalidating any rule
on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not
before the Court is "strong medicine" to be applied "spar
ingly and only as a last resort. "1 00
But this is exactly what

Pacifica

does, assuming that what the

FCC's rule does is chill only patently offensive references that
have little or no social value101 based on the majority's assessment
of the worth of Carlin's monologue. 102 Since Carlin's monologue is
the proxy for all these "patently offensive references,"103 it is im
portant to further examine the Court's analysis of the monologue .
The opinion continued to explain that i f the government has
"any power to restrict the public broadcast" of this kind of lan
guage, "this was an appropriate occasion for its exercise."104 Al
though Carlin's monologue was speech and "the Commission's
objections to the broadcast were based in part on its content,"105
the majority accepted the FCC's proposition that such obj ections
are not fatal to regulation under the First Amendment. In fact,
the Court accepted that,

in other contexts,

this monologue would

be protected. 106 Why not in this context? Because it was delivered
over the regulated airwaves, 107 because it entered homes unin100. Id. at 743-744 (citations omitted).
1 0 1 . See id. at 743 (stating that "[a]t most . . . the Commission's definition of indecency
will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive references"). The Court's support for
this conclusion is that "[a) requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication." Id. at 743
n. 18.
102. See id. at 743 (declining to protect "patently offensive sexual and excretory
speech"); id. at 750-751 (analogizing the monologue to a "pig'').
103. Id. at 7 43.
104. Id. at 7 44.
105. Id.
106. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746.
107. Id. at 748. The Court noted that the FCC may deny a broadcaster its license if it
"would serve 'the public interest, convenience, and necessity."' Id. (citing FCC v. WOKO,
Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946)). This is in contrast, the Court reasoned, with licensing other
types of speakers, which requires "laws that carefully define and narrow official discre
tion . . . ." Id. (construing Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U . S. 147 (1 969); Staub
v . City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 3 1 3 ( 1 958)).
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vited, 1 0 8 and because it was (and is) "uniquely pervasive,"109 an
swered the Court. Anyone with a license to broadcast over a pub
licly regulated radio frequency has a responsibility to listeners . Ho
Consequently,
[p] atently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in
the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be
left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of
an intruder. 1 1 1

For the Court, Pacifica's argument that form and content are nec
essarily intertwined is untenable:
If there were any reason to believe that the Commission's
characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could
be traced to its political content-or even to the fact that it
satirized contemporary attitudes about four-letter words
First Amendment protection might be required. But that is
simply not this case . 1 12

The Court continued:
The monologue does present a point of view; it attempts to
show that the words it uses are "harmless" and that our atti
tudes toward them are "essentially silly." The Commission

108. See id. at 748-749 (analogizing unexpected radio content to a physical blow or an
obscene phone call). The Court suggested that broadcasters cannot use warnings to protect
its audience from exposure to unexpected program content because listeners frequently
tune in and out of programs that are already in progress. Id. at 748. The Court also re
jected the idea that a listener unexpectedly exposed to obscene content can address the
situation by turning off the radio. Id. This, the Court reasoned, would be like telling an
assault victim that her remedy is to run away after receiving the initial blow. Id. at 748749 . The Court noted that "[o]ne may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option
does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a harm that has already taken
place." Id. at 749 (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 748. The Court's justification can be found in the text accompanying infra
note 1 1 3.
1 10. See generally In re Compls. against Various Broad. Licenses regarding the Airing
of the "Golden Globe Awards " Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4994 ( 1 994) [hereinafter Golden
Globe Awards] (Adelstein, Commr., issuing separate statement) (concluding that
" [b]roadcasters . . . bear much of the responsibility to keep our airwaves decent" and that
they are "stewards of the public airwaves").
l l l . Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (citing Rowan u. U.S. Post Off. Dept. , 397 U.S. 728, 738
( 1 970)).
1 12 . Id. at 746 (citation omitted).
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objects, not to this point of view, but to the way in which it is
expressed. The belief that these words are harmless does not
necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them
while proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is
harmless does not license one to communicate that convic
tion by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene leaf
let.113
But satire is precisely this case. Carlin was critiquing contempo
rary attitudes about four-letter words. The question of whether
they should receive First Amendment protection is exactly what
is at issue here. It deserves more consideration than it in fact re
ceives.
In much satire, as well as in parody, form is linked to content,
but that fact does not preclude its protection under the First
Amendment. 11 4 To dismiss the First Amendment argument so
quickly without examining it more closely gives weight to the sus
picion that the Court simply does not want to recognize the le
gitimacy of opposition to the FCC's indecency policy or to the no
tion that the point of view and the way it is expressed in this par
ticular case cannot be divorced.

N. CRITICISM OF THE PACIFICA DECISION
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, stated that " [a] re 
quirement that indecent language be avoided will have its pri
mary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious com
munication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be ex

pressed by the use of less offensive language . " 1 1 5 Justice Stevens
is, of course, correct. If one's sole purpose is to express thought,
what the FCC terms "decent" language may be perfectly ade
quate. But the difference in image and impact between "decent"
and "indecent" language may be the difference between a clinical
description and a vivid and visceral one or between a piece of me113.

Id. at 746 n. 22 (internal cross-reference omitted).

1 14. See generally Campbell u. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-581 (1994)
(reasoning that parody necessarily mimics the content of another work and that "parody
often shades into satire") ; Jordan M. Blanke, Victor's Little Secret: Supreme Court Decision
Means More Protection for Trademark Parody, 13 Fordham Intell. Prop . , Media & Ent. L.J.
1053, 1060 (2003) (concluding that "(p]arody is a form of expression that is clearly and
staunchly protected by the First Amendment" (citation omitted)).
1 1 5. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 n. 18.
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diocre writing and a work of great literature. A good deal of
Chaucerian or Shakespearean language is, if presented as writ

ten, indecent. 1 16 Yet, according to the Court, Shakespearian lan

guage might not be relegated to the "safe harbor" period deemed
appropriate for Carlin's monologue. 1 1 1
Why not? After

Pacifica, the difference turns on whether the

FCC believes the play and its author are more worthy of family
hour broadcast, on context as well as on language itself.
Now, the suggestion that form has no effect on content is an
interesting one, and it is one apparently with which many com
mentators do not quarrel. But they should. The majority is limit
ing its opinion to

this case. 1 18 And in this case, under these facts,

the Court should have made a different decision, giving First
Amendment protection to

this speech. Satirists like Carlin rely on

both form and content to deliver their message . 1 1 9 If the Court
limits First Amendment protection of the content, it also seriously
limits the message. If it also limits protection of the form (through
channeling, for example), it cripples that message even more se
verely. In Carlin's case, ironically, the Court may have anointed
him a more prescient First Amendment scholar than anyone
could have predicted. Not only does the Court allow the FCC to
prohibit the occasional "Jerry Garcia" adjectival use of exple
tives 12 0 and the extended "Charlie Walker" content-based use of
1 1 6. E.g. id. at 750 n. 29 (quoting "[a]nd prively he caughte hire by the queynte" from
Geoffrey Chaucer's Miller's Tale, from The Canterbury Tales, Chaucer's Complete Works
58 (Cambridge 1933)); infra n. 122 (discussing Shakespeare's phrase "the beast with two
backs"). Thomas Bowdler made a career of excising objectionable passages from Shake·
speare and other classics in order not to offend the sensibilities of a sensitive age. 4 Ency.
Americana 362 (Grolier 2001). His name gave us the new verb, ''bowdlerize." Id.
1 1 7. See id. at 750 (distinguishing the Carlin monologue from an Elizabethan comedy);
id. at 733 (noting the FCC's claim that it intended only to "channel [this type of language]
to times of day when children most likely would not be exposed to it" (citation omitted)).
1 18. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (stating that the Court's review "is limited to the
question whether the Commission has the authority to proscribe this particular broad·
cast") .
1 1 9. See Pacifica, 4 3 8 U.S. a t 730 (stating that Carlin uses words t o satirize the con
tem porary views concerning the offensive nature of obscenities, exposing those views as
"harmless" and "essentially silly'').
120. See id. at 741 n. 1 6 (citing WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d at 4 1 2) . In WUHY-FM, the
FC C im posed liability upon a radio station for Jerry Garcia's repeated use of profanity on
air. 24 F.C.C. 2d at 409, 4 1 5. The Court concluded that "debate does not require that per
sons being interviewed . . . on talk programs have the right to . . . use 'f-----g,' or 'mother
f--- --g' as gratuitous adjectives throughout their speech. This fosters no debate, serves no
social purpose, and would drastically curtail the usefulness of radio for millions of people. "
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suggestive material,1 2 1 but now, after Pacifica, it allows the FCC
to channel the repeated use of "indecent language" to a more ap
propriate hour, reasoning that it deserves less First Amendment
protection than an Elizabethan comedy. 1 22
Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall dissented in
Pac ifica. 1 23 Justice Brennan wrote the following:

The Court's balance, of necessity, fails to accord proper
weight to the interests of listeners who wish to hear broad
casts the FCC deems offensive. It permits majoritarian
tastes completely to preclude a protected message from en
tering the homes of a receptive, unoffended minority. No de
cision of this Court supports such a result. Where the indi
viduals constituting the offended majority may freely choose
to reject the material being offered, we have never found
their privacy interests of such moment to warrant the sup
pression of speech on privacy grounds .1 24
At the time of the decision, court-watchers were split. Com
mentator George Will applauded the majority for recognizing that
Carlin's use of indecent language added nothing to his commen-

Id. at 415 (alterations in original).
121. See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 n. 16 (citing Robinson

v.

FCC, 334 F.2d at

535 (discussing the use of indecent material in various mediums, such as radio, television,
and magazines). In Robinson, the appellate court affirmed the FCC's decision not to renew
the license of a radio station when the station manager attempted to mislead the FCC as
to his knowledge of "vulgar and suggestive" comments made on-air by host Charlie
Walker. 334 F.2d at 534-536. Note that the court's decision was specifically limited to the
station manager's dishonesty. Id. at 536.
122.

See supra n. 1 17 and accompanying text (comparing Carlin to Shakespeare). Per

haps the suggestion is that if the word is indecent but most of the audience is sufficiently
ignorant to miss the meaning, the FCC will deem it acceptable. Note that Elizabethan
comedies contain a great deal of raunchy language. Shakespeare is, after all, the man who
invented the phrase "the beast with two backs." Eric Partridge, Shakespeare's Bawdy 144
(3d ed., Routledge 1990) (explaining that the phrase, used in Othello, refers to the act of
sexual intercourse). That much of the Bard's language goes over the heads of today's audi
ences may be the reason that it could so easily get a family-hour-broadcast slot.
123.

See e.g. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 778-780 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the

legislative record does not support the majority's conclusion that "indecent" and "obscene"
are distinct); id. at 762, 777 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); infra n. 124 and ac
companying text (quoting Justice Brennan).
124. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tary . 125 Writer Nicholas von Hoffman objected that the decision
"wasn't an intelligent one." 1 26 He pointed out that
studies show that next to no children listen to any radio sta
tion at that hour on a weekday for the reason that they are
locked up in school taking sex[-]education courses where
presumably Carlin's Anglo-Saxon terminology is replaced
with Latin cognates on whose acceptability for broadcasting
neither the commission nor our nine most exalted juris
prudes have yet to rule. 1 27

Just as the dissent does in

Pacifica, a fair number of scholars
have criticized the decision for various reasons. In his book The
First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance, 1 28 Steven Shiffrin
wrote that
[m]ost people with any [F]irst [A] mendment bones in their
bodies are troubled by the Pacifica case.... [The] case pro
duces heat precisely because Carlin's speech is considered by
many to be precisely what the first amendment is supposed
to protect. Carlin is attacking conventions; assaulting the
prescribed orthodoxy; mocking the stuffed shirts; Carlin is
the prototypical dissenter. 1 2 9

Professor Laurence Tribe commented that "the strangest
thing about the Court's decision was that no one could reasonably
supp ose that children were listening to the radio station at 2
o'clock in the afternoon ." 1 30
125. George F. Will, Is There a 'Periphery' on the First Amendment? Wash. Post B7
(July 9, 19 78).
1 26. Nicholas von Hoffman, Seven Dirty Words: A Cute Form of Censorship, Wash. Post
E3 (July 29, 1 978).
1 27. Id.
128. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Harvard U.
Press 1 990 ).
1 29. Id. at 80.
1 30. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 937 (2d ed., Found. Press 1 988)
(citations omitted). Tribe reasoned as follows:
WBAI, the broadcast station involved, is listener-supported, carries no ads, does not
play "top forty" records, and directs its programming at a distinctly adult, left-to
radical, upper-middle-class audience. In addition, studies show that virtually no
children listen to any radio station whatsoever at that time on a weekday for the
reason that most children are then in school. Nor is it probable that any significant
number of adults were offended by Carlin's monologue. Certainly WBAI's regular lis
teners were unlikely to be scandalized; in any case, the station prefaced the broad-
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ia
Anne Coughlin, a professor a t the University o f Virgin
School of Law, echoed C arlin's point with regard to the discuss ion
of pornography and raised another point even more directly as
follows:

How do scholars speak about that of which it is forbidden to
speak? This question occupies a margin of the debate over
the regulation of pornography since, whatever else it may be,
pornography always has been unspeakable. Pornography is
a way of representing sex that is enabled by and parasitical
on cultural norms forbidding us to represent sex that way.
Porn is delivered through many media, including art, pho
tography, and cinematography, but it continues to find a
home in prose too. Hence the dilemma for scholars and the
critical question for this [e]ssay: with what language and
through which methods may we present the forbidden with
out representing it?l31

cast with warnings of the sensitive language to come. That left at risk the radio lis
teners who, turning the dials, stumbled briefly onto the offensive program. The
number of such accidents had to be miniscule, much smaller than the number of
WBAI listeners who enjoyed Mr. Carlin's satire. Indeed, the record showed that only
one person complained-an unidentified citizen who, while driving in his car with
his son, tuned into WBAI, heard Carlin's monologue, and apparently chose to turn
no further. Given the facts, that the Court did not hold the FCC's order unconstitu
tional suggests something else was afoot.
Id.
1 3 1 . Anne Coughlin, Representing the Forbidden, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 2 1 43, 2 143 (2002)
(citations omitted). Since the Court's 2002 decision in Ashcroft, which held that a law regu
lating virtual child pornography was overbroad and unconstitutional, one way to "present
the forbidden without representing it" is by virtual recreation. Id. at 2 1 43 (citing Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)). In Ashcroft, the Court examined the Child
Pornography Act of 1996, which attempted to limit a form of pornography that was neither
obscene nor child pornography under the Court's existing caselaw. 535 U.S. at 239; see also
Miller v. Cal. , 4 1 3 U.S. 15, 24 (1 973) (summarizing the obscenity standard); N. Y. v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 756-766 (1 982) (describing the child-pornography standard) . The Ashcroft
Court noted that the Act prohibited not only computer-generated images of children engag
ing in sexual acts but also "images that appear to depict a minor engaging in sexually
explicit activity (,)" which would chill speech that is rich in literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value. 535 U.S. at 246. The law prohibited speech that recorded no crime or cre
ated any victims in its production. Id. at 250. Thus, in some situations, the First Amend
ment protects artificial pornography to a greater extent than it does real pornography.
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V AFTER PACIFICA

Let us move from the

Pacifica decision, which incorporates

the determination that the public airwaves are a public trust 1 32
and that "indecent words," whatever those words might be, when
spoken in the middle of the afternoon constitute a nuisance133
should be channeled to a more appropriate hour. Let us assume
this is true because those "indecent words" came into the home
and imposed on unwitting and unprepared listeners, and there
was nothing in the listeners' powers to prevent the "indecent
words" from reaching them.134
Even if all of this is true, the subsequent history of the i nde
cency rationale suggests that, with the development of technol
ogy, the changes in attitudes towards speech, and the FCC's ap
parent inability to apply the indecency standard uniformly, the
time has come for the Court to re-examine and perhaps abandon

Pacifica.
Once the Court handed down its opinion in

Pacifica, the FCC
seemed to consider carefully its next move. The Pacifica Court, by
explicitly discussing the narrowness of its holding and emphasiz
ing that "a host of variables" (including time of day, program con
tent, and transmission medium) play into a nuisance determina
tion, 135 indirectly cautioned the FCC to apply

Pacifica with care.

For many years, the agency did so. 136 The FCC (and its licensees
as well) seemed to understand that the decision meant the words
that Carlin identified were indeed the words one could not say on

1 32 . See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1 984) (reasoning
that "given spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a
sense as fiduciaries for the public"); Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 376 (holding that ''broadcast
frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized
only by the Government"); Patrick S. Ryan, Application of the Public-Trust Doctrine and
Principles of Natural Resource Management to Electromagnetic Spectrum, 10 Mich. Tele
commun. & Tech. L. Rev. 285 (2004) (discussing the need to apply the public-trust doctrine
to the electromagnetic spectrum to guarantee its efficient use).
13 3. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (noting that "the [FCC's] decision rested entirely on a
nuisance rationale").
134. See supra n. 1 08 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of a listener to
erase what has been heard).
135. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
136. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1 486 (enforcing the rule based on a conservative
reading of the Pacifica holding).
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radio or television. 137 For the next decade or so, the agency, under
the leadership of Reagan-appointee Mark Fowler, moved slug
gishly against licensees despite the regular receipt of indecency
complaints. 138
By the mid- 1 980s, however, a number of lobbying groups, dis
satisfied with the Reagan administration's agenda as it pertained
to indecency, moved to ratchet up the attack, and by 1 987, the
FCC had issued rulings against several licensees. 139 For years the
unstated assumption had been that "only material that closely
resembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy the inde
cency [standard] . . . . " 140 Broadcasters may not have liked the
standard Pacifica created, but at least they had figured out its
p arameters; now, those parameters seemed to be changing as the
FCC undertook a much more aggressive stance on indecency. But
since the Court had expressly cautioned against such an expan
sive definition of indecency, 1 4 1 the question became whether the
FCC's newest actions could pass constitutional muster.142 By
1 987, the National Association of Broadcasters had requested

137. Id. (conservatively reading that the "seven dirty words" could not be spoken before
1 0:00 p.m. and that "indecency" was not broader than these "seven dirty words").
138. Id. at 1486-1487 (referring to the ''hands -off regulation" fostered by appointee
Mark Fowler, who did not want to involve the FCC in any kind of broadcast-content regu
lation); see also John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of
the New FCC Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 329, 329-337 (1989) (dis
cussing the history of the indecency regime).
139. Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1488. After the FCC and Fowler received a lot of
pressure from conservative groups like the National Decency Forum and Morality in Me
dia, the FCC brought three indecency actions within a matter of four months. Id.
140. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. , 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 ( 1 987).
141. Pacifica, 428 U.S. at 743.
142. The Court examined the FCC's actions more thoroughly as follows:
It is true that the Commission's order may lead some broadcasters to censor them
selves. At most, however, the Commission's definition of indecency will deter only
the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and
activities. While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the pe
riphery of First Amendment concern. The danger dismissed so summarily in Red
Lion, in contrast, was that broadcasters would respond to the vagueness of the regu
lations by refusing to present programs dealing with important social and political
controversies. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to
situations not before the Court is "strong medicine" to be applied "sparingly and only
as a last resort." We decline to administer that medicine to preserve the vigor of pat
ently offensive sexual and excretory speech.
Pacifica 428 U.S. at 743 (quoting Broadrick
citations omitted).

u.

Okla., 4 1 3 U.S. 601, 6 1 3 (1973)) (internal
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clarification, 143 and the FCC officially established a "safe harbor"
period during which indecent material could be broadcasted (this
period generally ran from midnight to 6:00 a.m.). 1 44 A flurry of
litigation followed; 145 it did not end until the District of Columbia
Circuit accepted the "support for parental supervision of children"
and the "concern for children's well-being" rationales as sufficient
to allow Congress to narrowly limit lic.ensees' broadcasting of in
decent material in

Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 146 the

third of the so-called "ACT" cases . 147 Important in the District of
Columbia Circuit's decision were studies showing that a substan
tially smaller number of children were in the audience after mid
night as opposed to during the daytime hours, 148 and the fact that
adults, although burdened by the restrictions, could either stay
up late or find an alternative source to satisfy their tastes (per
haps b y renting a video) . 149
The majority examined an exception to Congress's promul
gated rule in the case, Section 16(a) of the Public Telecommunica
tions Act of

1992, 150 and pointed out that while commercial broad-

143. In re Infinity, 3 F.C.C.R. at 93 1-933 (requesting clarification of the phrase "con
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium," and of the term "patently
offensive," as these terms are used in the definition of indecency).
144. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 1 1 F.3d 1 70, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1 993), vacated, 15
F.3d 1 86 (D.C. Cir. 1 994).
145. See id. (discussing the FCC's broader enforcement by the establishment of a safe
harbor from midnight to 6:00 a.m. and broadening the term to indecency rather than just
"filthy words").
146. Action for Children 's TV v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D. C . Cir. 1995).
1 4 7. Id. at 660.
1 48 . Id. at 665. The court noted the following:
It is apparent, then, that of the approximately 20.2 million teenagers and 36.3 mil
lion children under [the age of twelve] in the United States, a significant percentage
watch broadcast television or listen to radio from as early as 6:00 a.m. to as late as
1 1 :30 p.m. ; and in the case of teenagers, even later. We conclude that there is a rea
sonable risk that large numbers of children would be exposed to any indecent mate
rial broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and midnight.

Id. (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 666. In concluding that the FCC regulations have taken into account the
First Amendment rights of adults wishing to view or listen to "indecent broadcasts" rele
gated to the midnight-to-6:00 a.m. timeslot, the Court stated that
[w]hile the numbers of adults watching television and listening to the radio after
midnight are admittedly small, they are not insignificant. Furthermore, as we have
noted above, adults have alternative means of satisfying their interest in indecent
material at other hours in ways that pose no risk to minors.
Id.
1 50. The Public Telecommunications Act is available at Title 47 of the United States
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casters could broadcast indecent materials only between the
hours of midnight and 6 : 00 a.m., public broadcasters were permit
ted to broadcast the same indecent materials from 1 0 : 00 p.m. to
6:00 a. m . 15 1 After noting there was no compelling interest for ad
vancing such a distinction, the Court found the Act was unconsti
tutional to the extent it prohibited the broadcasting of indecent
speech between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and midnight.152 Thus,
the safe harbor reverted to the current 10:00 p.m.-to-6:00 a.m.
period. 153
The decision resulted in a passionate dissent from Judge Ed
wards, who pointed out that if indecency is truly harmful to chil
dren, perhaps the Court would have been better off focusing its
efforts on cable operators, who the judge called "the real culprits"
as opposed to the broadcasters. 154
Judge Edwards noted the availability of filtering technol
ogy, 155 a point which Pacifica had made in its brief to the Supreme
Court in 1 9 78. 156 Filtering technology might not have been a pow
erful tool in 1 9 78, but by 1 995 it was far more effective.157 In the
1 990s, moreover, content-advisory systems began appearing on
television as broadcasters began signaling to viewers which pro-

Code.
151.

Id. at 656. This original "exception" to the rnidnight-to-6:00 a.rn. rule permitted

"public radio and television stations that go off the air at or before midnight to broadcast
such materials after 1 0:00 p.m." Id.
152. Id.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 672 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). The majority emphasized that traditional

broadcast media is subject to more stringent regulation than cable media, stating that
"[u] nlike cable subscribers, who are offered such options as 'pay-per-view' channels, broad
cast audiences have no choice but to 'subscribe' to the entire output of traditional broad
casters. Thus they are confronted without warning with offensive material." Id. at 660
(majority).
155.

Id. at 683 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting). Judge Edwards noted that in the original

FCC Enforcement Order, there was no discussion of alternative means of preventing chil
dren from observing "indecent broadcasts." Id. at 682. However, Judge Edwards high
lighted that "at oral argument, counsel for the FCC assured the court that blocking tech
nology, in which a chip placed in television sets prevents certain shows from being trans
mitted, is available." Id. at 683. Also, "[i]n the Alliance case heard on the same day as

[Action for Children's TV], the Commission presented another alterative, a segregate-and
scramble scheme of indecent programming on cable's leased access channels." Id.
156.
157.

Br. for Respt. at 49, Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.

Id.
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grams contained violence, objectionable language, or explicit sex
ual content. 158
Under the Clinton administration, the FCC pursued rela
tively few i ndecency complaints except for the most egregious of
fenses (not surprisingly, shock-jock Howard Stern was often the
culprit in these cases) . 1 59 However, during the George H.W. Bush
administration,

those

inclined to bring indecency complaints

found that they met with a far more sympathetic FCC. Beginning
with an incident at a movie awards show, the FCC signaled that
it once again wished to expand its definition of indecency beyond
Carlin's seven dirty words all the way to single uses of objection
able language. In other words, it was now cracking down on acci
dental uses of profanity on the airwaves, those slip-ups known as
"fleeting expletives." 160
The trouble began at the 2003 Golden Globe Awards, where
musician Bono took the stage and said "this is really, really, fuck
ing brilliant."161 NBC failed to prevent the speech from reaching
the air. In response, the FCC issued its infamous

Golden Globes

order and began enforcing a strict rule that imposed monetary
penalties on broadcasters who allowed a fleeting expletive to
reach the airwaves. 162 Although the FCC E nforcement Bureau
ruled that Bono's use of "fuck" was not indecent, the FCC re1 58. Jim Abbott, When Will Shows Carry Rating Labels? Orlando Sentinel A6 (Dec. 9,
1 996). Becaus e of "pressure from Congress, President Clinton and the Federal Communi
cations Commission, the [television] industry began devising the voluntary system in
February [ 1 996] ." Id.
1 59. See Infinity Broadcasting Pays $1 Million as Part of Settlement Resolving Inde
cency Complaints, 1995 FCC LEXIS 7304 (Nov. 8, 1995) (discussing the indecent pro
gramming on "The Howard Stern Show").
160. Fox TV Stations , 489 F.3d at 446-447 .
1 6 1 . Id. at 451. A complaint was filed with the FCC by the Parents Television Council
arguing "the material was obscene and indecent under FCC regulations." Id. According to
its Web site, the Parents Television Council's mission statement is
to promote and restore responsibility and decency to the entertainment industry in
answer to America's demand for positive, family-oriented television programming.
The PTC does this by fostering changes in TV programming to make the early hours
of prime time family-friendly and suitable for viewers of all ages.
Parents Tele vision Council, Frequently Asked Questions, "What Is the PTC's Mission?"
http ://www.parentstv.org/PTC/faqs/main.asp#What%20is%20the%20PTCs%20mission (ac
cessed June 1 3 , 2008 ).
162. Fox, 489 F.3d at 452. The court explained that "NBC, along with several other
parties including Fox, filed petitions for reconsideration of the Golden Globes order, raising
statutory and constitutional challenges to the new policy." Id. However, "[t]hese petitions
have been pending for more than two years without any action by the FCC." Id.
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versed not only the Bureau, but also its own long-established pol
icy. The agency cast its net all the way back to a 1 9 3 1 ruling,
Duncan v. United States, 163 to find precedent. 1 64 It also dredged
up another appellate court decision, Tallman v. United States, 165
which, frankly, does not seem to apply. 166 In any event, broad
casters were thereafter on notice1 67 that fleeting and isolated use
of an expletive (in other words, rather than repeated and inten
tional use of the kind seen in Carlin's monologue) was sufficient
for the agency to impose sanctions . 168
The tension between the FCC's restraint after Pacifica and
its newly formulated policy on fleeting expletives came to a head
shortly after the Golden Globes order was issued, and it was not
well-received. In Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 1 69 the Second
Circuit found a strange anomaly in the FCC's application of its
new policy. While the FCC would impose a sanction on an enter
tainer who used an expletive fleetingly at an awards ceremony, 1 70
a news program in which an interviewee uttered an expletive, 1 7 1
or a station that broadcasts a movie with the expletives intact,
would not be sanctioned . 1 72 That inconsistency proved to be a ma
jor problem.
163.

48 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1931).

164.

See id. at 134 (holding that the defendant had used the word "damned" and had

used the expression "by God" on the radio and that this speech was profane, though not
indecent).
165. 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972).
166.

See id. at 287 (upholding the conviction of petitioner, who was tried for broadcast

ing obscenities under Title 18, Section 1464 of the United States Code and appealed that
conviction). The petitioner claimed the trial judge should have instructed the jury on the
meaning of "indecent" and "profane[,]" but the appellate court found no error for failure to
instruct the jury on the meaning of these words because the case was tried solely as an
obscenity case. Id. at 286.
167. The FCC decided not to sanction NBC for the incident because it "necessarily did
not have the requisite notice to j ustify a penalty[,]" further illustrating the abrupt policy
change this decision brought. Fox, 489 F.3d at 452.
168. Id. at 447 .
169.

489 F.3d 444.

170.

Id. at 455-456. The court noted that "there is no question that the FCC has
changed its policy. As outlined in detail above, prior to the Golden Globes decision the FCC
had consistently taken the view that isolated, non-literal, fleeting expletives did not run
afoul of its indecency regime." Id. at 455.
1 7 1 . Id. at 458.
172.

Id. at 45�459. The FCC relied on the "first blow" theory detailed in the Supreme

Court's Pacifica case when rationalizing their recent attack on "fleeting expletives." Id. at
457. In that case, the Supreme Court supported the FCC's regulation of broadcast media
because such material enters "the privacy of the home uninvited and without warning." Id.
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Fox arose after the FCC issued its 2006 Omnibus Order,
which concluded that several television broadcasts were indecent
and profane . 173 These broadcasts included the following:
•

A 2002 Fox broadcast of the

Billboard Music Awards i n

which Cher stated, "People have been telling m e I'm o n the
way out every year, right? So fuck 'em." 1 74
•

A 2003 Fox broadcast of the

•

Various episodes of ABC's NYPD Blue in which characters

Billboard Music Awards in
which Nicole Richie, one of the presenters on the show,
stated, "Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada
purse? It's not so fucking simple."175

used expletives

including ''bullshit," "dick," and "dick

head." 1 7 6
•

An episode of CBS's

The Early Show, in which an inter

viewee, a contestant on the hit reality show Survivor, re
ferred to a fellow contestant as a ''bullshitter."177
In the O mnibus Order, the FCC cited Golden Globes for the prin
cip le that expletives need not be repeated for a finding of inde
cen cy. 1 78 Prior to the court's decision in Fox, the FCC i ssued a re-

The Supreme Court "rejected the argument that the audience could simply tune-out: 'To
say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."'
Id. at 457-458. The present court, however, rej ected this argument as support for the
recent change in FCC policy, noting that "the 'first blow' theory bears no rational connec
tion to the Commission's actual policy regarding fleeting expletives." Id. at 458.
1 73. Id. at 452 (discussing Compls. regarding Various TV Broads. between Feb. 2, 2002
a nd Mar. 8, 2005, 2 1 F.C.C.R 2664 (2006), the case which issued the order). Through that
O m nibus Order, "the FCC intended to 'provide substantial guidance to broadcasters and
the public about the types of programming that are impermissible under our indecency
sta ndard."' Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
1 76. Id.
177. Id. The court explained that "[i]n finding these programs indecent and profane, the
F CC reaffirmed its decision in Golden Globes that any use of the word 'fuck' is presump·
tively indecent and profane. The Commission then concluded that any use of the word
'sh it' was also presumptively indecent and profane." Id. (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 453. The court discussed the prior filings of Fox, CBS, and ABC, explaining
th at "Fox and CBS filed a petition for review of the Omnibus Order in this court (the Sec·
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mand order, 179 reversing parts of its Omnibus Order as i t applied
to The Early Show because it occurred in the context of a "bona
fide news interview." 1 80 The broadcasters contended that the FCC
had made a 1 80-degree turn regarding its treatment of "fleeting
expletives" and had done so without any explanation whatso
ever. 181
The Second Circuit began by noting that it was evident that
the FCC had drastically changed its policy i n regards to "fleeting
expletives"; 1 82 after all, from the time of Pacifica until the period
before Golden Globes, the agency had consistently found that
fleeting expletives did not violate indecency standards. 183 The
agency did an about-face in Golden Globes, announcing it would
no longer follow its past policies regarding fleeting expletives. 184
The Second Circuit pointed out that this kind of impromptu
change in policy does not pass administrative muster because it
did not provide a reasoned analysis explaining the change. 185 The
FCC had failed to inform licensees of the new policy in advance
ond Circuit). ABC filed a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit, which was then trans·
ferred to this court and consolidated with the petition for review filed by Fox and CBS." Id.

1 79.

Id. The Supreme Court, "[o]n September 7, 2006, . . . granted the FCC's request for

remand and stayed the enforcement of the Omnibus Order. The Commission was given
sixty days to issue a final or appealable order, at which time the pending appeal would be
automatically reinstated.'" Id.
1 80.

Id. at 454 (emphasis in original). The ruling against NYPD Blue was also dis·

missed because the complainant watched the program in a region where the show was
broadcast within the "safe harbor'" period after 10 p.m. Id. at 453 n. 5. The FCC, in the
Remand Order, '"reaffirmed its finding that the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Award
programs were indecent and profane.'' Id. at 453.
181.

Id. at 454. Other arguments against the FCC Remand Order included the follow·

ing:
(2) The FCC's '"community standards� analysis is arbitrary and meaningless; (3) The
FCC"s indecency findings are invalid because the Commission made no finding of
scienter; (4) the FCC"s definition of "profane" is contrary to law; (5) the FCC's inde·
cency regime is unconstitutionally vague; (6) the FCC's indecency test permits the
Commission to make subjective determinations about the quality of speech in viola
tion of the First Amendment; and

(7) the

FCC's indecency regime is an impermissi·

hie content-based regulation of speech that violates the First Amendment.
Id. The court agreed with the first argument, and as a result did not address any of the
other arguments. Id.
182. Id.
1 83.

Id. at 455. The court lists several FCC rulings supporting the previous "fleeting

expletives" policy. Id.
184 . Id. at 456.
1 8il.

Id. nt 462. Agencies, like the FCC, '"are of course free to revise their rules and

policie11. Such a change, however, must provide a reasoned analysis for departing from
prior precedent." Id. nt 456 (citations omitted).
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and with s ufficient specificity so that they could understand the
policy.186
In dicta, the Second Circuit pointed out that the subjective
nature of the policy probably would not pass constitutional mus
ter. 187 For example, the Academy-Award winning Saving Private
Ryan, riddled with expletives, garnered complaints from viewers
when ABC ran it in 200 4 . 188 The FCC found the expletives so nec

essary and essential to the film (it claimed that deleting the ex
pletives "would have altered the nature of the artistic work and
diminished the power, realism [,] and immediacy of the film ex
perience for viewers") that it declined to sanction ABC for the
broadcast. 1 89 Yet occasional or singular expletives spoken in other
shows were not so protected. The Second Circuit pronounced itself
mystified by this contradiction. 19° This kind of subjective analysis
on the part of the FCC was what gave rise to George Carlin's
monologue back in the 1 970s .
Consider the way expletives were used in Saving Private
Ryan. When the soldiers in the movie cursed, they did not intend

in any sense to give the words any literal meaning or provide any
description of sexual or excretory activities. Rather, they used the
expl etives as Jerry Garcia once did191 and as Bono did at the
Golden Glo be Awards . 192 Even President Bush once used an ex
pletive "in a manner that no reasonable person would believe ref
erenced 'sexual or excretory organs or activities."1 93

1 86. For more on the Second Circuit's rejection of the FCC policy, see Christine A. Cor
cos, Small Curses, Big Problems, 30 Leg. Times No. 29 (July 16, 2007).
1 87 .
188.

Fox, 489 F.3d at 462.

In re Compls. against Various TV Licensees regarding Their Broad. on Nov. 1 1 ,
2004, of the ABC TV Network's Presentation of the Film "Saving Private Ryan", 2 0 F.C.C.R.

4507, 45 1 2-45 1 3 (2005).
1 89. Id. at 4 5 1 2-45 1 3.

1 90. Fox, 489 F.3d at 462. On March 1 7, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the case. John Eggerton, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Fleeting-Profanity Case, Broad
casti ng C able, http://www.broadcas tingcable.com/article/CA5 4 1 006.html (Mar. 1 7, 2008).
191.
1 92.

Supra nn. 22-27 and accompanying text.
Fox, 489 F.3d at 4 5 1 .

1 93. Id. at 459. During a discussion with a former British Prime Minister a t a Group of
Eight Summit in 2006, President Bush remarked that "the United Nations needed to 'get
Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit[.]'" Id. An open microphone caught his lin
guis tic fa ux pas. Brooks Boliek, Bush Slip-up Trips up Indecency Law, Hollywood Reporter
(J uly 1 8, 2006).
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Would a serious commentary on the Elizabethan comedy dis
cussed in Pacifica, 194 broadcast over the licensed airwaves earn an
FCC sanction under the "fleeting expletives" regime? Certainly, a
licensee might think twice about broadcasting such a documen
tary or a documentary that traced the evolution of the meanings
of bawdy words-for example, those words used in that Elizabe
than comedy-even though its intent might be to educate the pub
lic on changing meanings. Perhaps such a licensee might prefer to
keep such documentaries unaired, and the audience in ignorance.
VI. CONCL USION

When George Carlin created his famous monologue, he did so
not only to poke fun at the FCC but also to force us to consider
why we react as we do to certain words. He delivered his mono
logue to a live audience, not over the airwaves, but he intended
his comments not just for governmental officials but for those who
appoint them and for those who elect those who appoint them.
Indecent and offensive language was with us in 1 9 73, in 1 978,
and it is with us now. If one objects to it, the reaction to it can be
to use the tools now available at one's disposal, including those
that were not available in 1 978 (or at least not readily available),
such as effective filtering technology, V-Chips, and ratings sys
tems. These tools put more power in the hands of the adults who
may not want their impressionable children hearing indecent
language or content; at the same time, these tools also allow will
ing adults to hear that language or content. 195 Thus, viewers who
consistently object to radio or television content can force broad
casters to change that content without turning to the FCC or to
the courts. 1 96
194.
195.

438 U.S. at 750.
Fox, 489 F 3d at 465-466.
.

See Brown & Candeub, supra n. 7, at 1501 (discussing the case of Terri Rakolta,
who successfully objected to an episode of the Fox comedy series Married with Children
196.

and obtained the withdrawal of one advertiser). In some cases, TV itself parodies this
process. In the episode "But First a Word from Our Sponsor" (first broadcast March 19,

1 990) of the CBS comedy series Murphy Brown, news reporter Murphy Brown confronts an
advertiser whom she fears is ready to pull out of sponsoring the program FYI because of
controversial material (sex education for children) and opposition from a parents' lobbying
group. Murphy Brown, "But First a Word from Our Sponsor" (CBS March 19, 1990) (TV
series). She discovers that the sponsor regards support for the program as nothing more
than a good business decision. Id.
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The Don Imus case can be illustrative here. 197 As you might
recall, Imus was the controversial radio host who was fired from
CBS Radio and MSNBC after referring to members of the Rutgers
University women's basketball team in a derogatory manner in
2007. 198 Listeners who dislike speech because they consider it in

decent or objectionable can "vote with their ears" by turning off
their radios or their televisions and by boycotting advertisers who
sponsor the programming. Imus lost several major sponsors in the
wake of his remarks about the women's team. 199 In the wake of
the Imus incident, some artists in other entertainment fields that
were known for using the kind of language Imus was criticized for
using eventually were forced into abjuring it.200 Public disap
proval and threats of a severe drop-off in sales pushed media
magnates like Russell Simmons to join the bandwagon of those
demanding that hip-hop and rap artists downplay or abandon

lyrics that emphasize violence and gender discrimination. 20 1 The
following illustrated this change:
On Monday hip-hop mogul Russell Simmons, who just two
weeks ago was arguing for the rights of rappers to express
themselves as artists, did a seeming about-face and called
for the voluntary banning of ''bitch," ''ho [,]" and the N-word
from the lexicon as "extreme curse words." He called for a
coal ition of industry executives to "recommend guidelines for
lyrical and visual standards ." 202

Unlike George Carlin, whose monologue resulted in a Su
pre me Court decision that to this day forces licensees to channel
ind ecent speech into "safe harbor" periods, Imus did not leave the
197. Teresa Wiltz & Darragh Johnson, The Imus Test: Rap Lyrics Undergo Examina
t io n Wash. Post C l (April 25, 2007).
198. Sarah McBride, Imus Signs Deal with Citadel to Return to Radio, Wall St. J. B4
,

(Nov . 2, 2007) .
199. Id. (discussing how advertisers dropped both the radio and television shows).
200. See Wiltz & Johnson, supra n. 1 97 (explaining how the use of this language is

becoming less accepted).
201. Id.

202. Id. Whether the criticism from people such as Al Sharpton really had more impact
than criticism from within CBS and MSNBC is, perhaps, open to question. See AP, Imus'
Set tleme nt Means He Could Return to Air, http://www.m snbc. msn.com/id/20263533/ (up
dated Aug. 14, 2007) (referring to Sharpton's protests); but see McBride, supra n. 1 98 (dis
cuss ing Sharpton's new view that he is ready to see Imus back on the air, as long as Imus
is essentially controlled).
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air because the FCC ruled his words were a nuisance. He left be
cause the outcries from the public essentially forced management
into firing him. 203
As a mature society, we can and must come to terms with our
notions about offensive speech because it has not and will not go
away. We confront it in the public square, 204 on the Internet, 205 on
CDs, on DVDs, on premium cable, 206 in theaters, and on movie
screens, where apart from obscenity laws the government cur
rently does not restrict it. 207 People like Lenny Bruce, Richard
Pryor, Dave Chappelle, George Carlin, and Don Imus force us to
face our fear of words and the ideas they represent.
In 1973, George Carlin, high school drop-out and constitu
tional law scholar, told us, apparently correctly, that he had de
termined the seven words that no one was allowed to utter on the
public airwaves . Thirty-five years later, he may still be correct. 208
To paraphrase what Winston Churchill said in another context,
we may have not yet seen what has become, in the Author's opin
ion, an ill-advised indecency rationale. We may not even have
seen the beginning of the end. But we may, perhaps, have seen
the end of the beginning .209

203.
204.

See Wiltz & Johnson, supra n. 197 (noting that Sharpton called for Imus' ouster).
See generally Cohen v. Cal. , 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that a state could not

make a public display of a four-letter expletive a criminal offense).
205.

See generally ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding that content·based blan·

ket restrictions on speech on the Internet violated the protections of the First Amend·
ment).
206.

Recently, some in Congress and at the FCC have indicated they will try to invoke

the 70170 rule in order to extend indecency rules to hitherto unregulated cable. See
Stephen Labaton, F. C. C. Chief Seeks Votes to Tighten Cable Rules, N.Y. Times Cl (Nov.
26, 2007) (noting that the FCC is having a difficult time garnering enough support to in·

voke the 70170 rule) . The 70/70 rule means that "the agency may adopt rules necessary to
promote 'diversity of information sources' once the [C]ommission concludes that cable
television is available to at least seventy percent of American households and at least
seventy percent of those households actually subscribe to a cable service."
207.

Id.'

See generally Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (establishing the Miller test to determine

whether material is obscene).
208. Several of the "seven words" would likely be deemed as either obscene or indecent
Broadcasters can air the indecent ones on television between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.; the ob
scene ones, however, are still forbidden. FCC, supra n. 6 1 .
209. "Now this i s not the end. I t i s not even the beginning of the end. But it i s perhaps
the end of the beginning." Churchill Ctr., Speeches and Quotes, "The End of t e Begin
ning", http ://www.winstonchurchill.org/i 4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=388; (accessed June
1 3 , 2008); see also Christine A. Corcos, Small Curses, Big Problems, supra n. 186 (discus s·

h

ing the FCC's thoughts on fining for the use of expletives).

